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Abstract
This article evaluates the eﬀects of intensive counseling schemes that are provided
to about 20% of the unemployed since the 2001 French unemployment policy reform
(PARE). Several of the schemes are dedicated at improving the quality of assignment
of workers to jobs. As a result, it is necessary to assess their impact on unemployment
recurrence as well as unemployment duration. Using duration models and a very
rich data set, we can identify heterogenous and time-dependent causal eﬀects of the
schemes. We find significant favorable eﬀects on both outcomes, but the impact on
unemployment recurrence is stronger than on unemployment duration. In particular,
the program shifts the incidence of recurrence, one year after employment, from
33 to 26%. This illustrates that labor market policies evaluations that consider
unemployment duration alone can be misleading.
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1 Introduction
The diﬃculty to allocate the right workers to the right jobs is an important source of
market frictions. Attention to this issue has led to renewed interest for the assignment
of heterogenous workers to heterogenous jobs in the recent literature.1 As better sorting
individuals into jobs has economic value, active labor market policies should be used to
assist the unemployed workers in order to improve their matches.
Many reforms involving such counseling and job-search assistance have been imple-
mented in OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s (Martin and Grubb, 2001). But
they are usually combined with monitoring of the unemployed and sanctions, so that
their assignment function has rarely been analysed per se. Compelling evidence that
reemployment services can be eﬃcient in reducing beneficiaries unemployment duration
is available in the US, based on randomized experiments (Meyer, 1995), and in the United
Kingdom (Dolton and O’Neill, 1996, 2002, Blundell et al., 2004). But, as Meyer puts it,
”the experiments have not convincingly separated the eﬀects of requirements and assis-
tance”. As a matter of fact, using a set of randomized trials that incorporated only the
element of work search verification, Ashenfelter et al. (2005) argue that such treatments
alone are not eﬀective. This implies, the authors say, that the benefit of reemployment
services derives mainly from job-search assistance. In the Netherlands, Gorter and Kalb
(1996) find rather limited impact of a monitoring and counseling program, while van den
Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) find none, because, they argue, monitoring may induce
the unemployed to search through an ineﬃcient channel. The counseling dimension of
those policies is therefore potentially more important than monitoring, but evidence is
still limited.
The exclusive purpose of several schemes implemented along a 2001 French unemploy-
ment policy reform is to influence search strategy so as to improve the adequacy between
the worker’s own capability and the kind of job she is searching. Others schemes sim-
ply aim at enhancing search eﬀort, through individual assistance. The French reform,
called Plan d’Aide au Retour à l’Emploi (PARE), introduced two main changes. On
the one hand, the degressivity of unemployment benefits was suppressed. On the other
hand, the public unemployment agency revised its support policy towards unemployed
persons. This reform departs from most of the foreign experiences in that very intensive
schemes are attributed to a rather modest share of the unemployed (less than 20%), at
a high cost (600 million euros a year). More importantly, limited actual monitoring is
taking place. Compulsory meetings are not used to control the search activities of the
unemployed workers, but mostly serves to decide on their allocation to the job-search
assistance programs. In this context, we hope to evaluate counseling actions per se.
If these policies can have the eﬀect of improving the quality of matches, evaluating
their incidence on unemployment duration alone is not suﬃcient. Indeed, better matches
should result in more productive and longer lasting jobs. Generally, unemployment rates
or employment levels in the long run involve both unemployment and employment du-
1Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999, Costrell and Loury, 2004, Teulings and Gautier, 2004, Shimer, 2005,
Teulings, 2005, Gautier and Teulings, 2005.
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rations. It could be tempting for the public employment service, or any provider, to
send workers to short-term or low paid jobs that are quite available, but do not last.
This would certainly increase transitions to work, but is not necessarily desirable. It is
therefore important to evaluate unemployment and employment durations altogether.
The major point of this paper is that evaluation of active labor market policies can be
misleading when employment duration is neglected. This is either because reduced unem-
ployment duration may come at the cost of increased recurrence or because poor impact
on unemployment duration does not imply that the program has failed if employment
duration improved.
Yet, most empirical studies do not attempt to evaluate whether reemployment poli-
cies increases job duration, although this question has been sometimes investigated for
training and employment subsidies (see e.g. Bonnal et al., 1997, Gritz, 1993). Blundell et
al. (2004) present estimation results which suggest that the New Deal for young people
in UK increases by 4.5% points the probability to find a job lasting at least 13 weeks (the
outcome variable), but the duration of employment is not formally analysed. Dolton and
O’Neill (2002) find no eﬀect of the Restart experiment on employment duration, but the
program has an important monitoring component which can induce people to accept
lower quality jobs. Weber and Hofer (2004) evaluate Austrian schemes similar to ours,
but do not consider unemployment recurrence.
In this study, we measure the eﬀectiveness of the four main counseling schemes oﬀered
to French unemployed, in raising the transition rate from unemployment to work and
lowering recurrence into unemployment. In some countries, controlled experiments are
available. In the present context, neither such an experiment nor a quasi-experimental
design is available, because the reform applies uniformly to all unemployed. In a compa-
rable situation, Gerfin and Lechner (2002) or Sianesi (2004) have evaluated several train-
ing and subsidized jobs programs simultaneously, using matching methods with rich data
bases. As such, they have to assume selection on observables. However, semi-parametric
identification of causal parameters in the presence of selectivity on unobservables is pos-
sible, relying on the timing of events and the proportional hazard specification (Abbring
and van den Berg, 2003). This strategy has been successfully implemented in a set of
recent papers (Abbring et al., 2000, Lalive et al., 2002a, 2002b, van den Berg et al., 2000,
van den Berg et al., 2004 - see also Bonnal et al., 1997, for an early model in that vein).
In this paper, we exploit an exceptional administrative database, set up by the French
unemployment agency, that contains data on about 400,000 individual unemployment
spells and very detailed information on services actually received, since implementation
of the reform until June 2004. The size of the data allows flexible estimation of the
impact of the four main schemes of the program, including heterogenous and time de-
pendent eﬀects. Because sampling is on individuals, we can observe both unemployment
duration and recurrence.
We find that scheme eﬀects on recurrence are strong and systematic, which we inter-
pret as evidence that they improve match quality. All schemes also increase unemployment-
employment transitions, but with smaller incidence. Because only a limited fraction of
the unemployed receive treatment, the program increases the proportion that has found
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a job after one year by less than one percentage point. But it decreases the incidence of
recurrence one year after a job is found by more than 6 percentage points. Therefore,
if unemployment duration alone was considered, treatment eﬀects would be strongly
underestimated.
Overall, this is evidence that counseling and job-search assistance are eﬀective, al-
though we do not provide a cost-benefit analysis for lack of data. This is an important
complement to the evaluation of labor market policies, which confirms recent insights.
It implies that countries that pursue these actions, often with increasing use of private
suppliers, are heading in the right direction.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the 2001 reform of
the French unemployment policy. Section 3 illustrates the economic interpretation of
the counseling schemes in the line of assignment models. Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 presents the empirical method, and estimation results are discussed in Sections
6 and 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The 2001 unemployment policy reform in France
The reform introduced in France in July 2001 was originally influenced by foreign expe-
riences but it ended up with quite distinctive features (Freyssinet, 2002). In particular,
sanctions and the definition of acceptable jobs remained based on already existing legal
requirements, which are far less compelling than several foreign experiences. In addition,
the public unemployment agency (ANPE), that is distinct from the institution provid-
ing benefits (UNEDIC), remained in charge of monitoring and counseling for all types
of unemployed. UNEDIC did not obtain new power with respect to sanctions.
The reform thus consisted mainly of two distinct elements: a more generous benefit
system overall (for entitled unemployed) and significantly stronger individual counseling
services oﬀered to the unemployed (whether insured or not), labelled the PAP program
(Projet d’action personnalisé). Regarding the latter, there were two main changes. First,
it was not unusual that an unemployed person would never meet the public unemploy-
ment agency caseworkers. A meeting (typically 30 minutes long) is now compulsory for
all newly registered unemployed and recurs at least every 6 months. This is a low fre-
quency, but not so far from international practice (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Depending
on the person’s profile, the caseworker can schedule follow-up interviews between two
compulsory meetings, and interviews can be requested at any moment by the unemployed
workers themselves.
Second, counseling services that existed before the reform were significantly extended,
at the cost of increased budget. Some are provided directly by ANPE, others are sub-
contracted. Before the reform, these schemes were open only to the long-term (more
than a year) unemployed. Training and employment subsidies are also in the range of
available measures, but they are not considered in this paper.
During the first compulsory meeting, the unemployed person and the caseworker
come together to an agreement about the degree of assistance that the person should
receive. This agreement is based on the person’s evaluation of her degree of autonomy
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in job-search and the caseworker’s evaluation of her capabilities of finding rapidly a job.
The interview concludes with the signing of the PAP contract which determines the
degree of assistance and the types of services the person should receive. In the first
interview, most of the unemployed workers are regarded as self-suﬃcient in their job
search. In this or subsequent interviews, the individuals who are considered to need
assistance can be oﬀered a scheme, depending on the availability of slots.
We are interested in 4 categories of schemes that group several variants of each type
of service2. Several other schemes do exist but they are shorter and have much lower
unit costs. These 4 schemes are the most significant aspects of the reform.
• The basic Skill assessment (“Evaluation”) lasts typically 1 day. The provider helps
the individual assess his professional skills, based on testing and simulated work
environment.
• Another skill assessment, that we label Project assessment (“Bilan de compétences
approfondi”), is aimed at individuals with a professional experience who have dif-
ficulties finding a job corresponding to their skills. It lasts 20 hours on average,
over a maximum period of 42 days. A personal adviser helps the individual analyse
her past experience, identify her skills and match them with a new employment
project compatible with the state of the labor market.
• Job-search support (“Objectif emploi” and similar schemes) is aimed at individuals
having a well-defined employment project, but experiencing diﬃculties in their job
search, with the aim of finding rapidly a ("long-term") job. It lasts up to 3 months.
In this intensive scheme, the individual is assigned a personal advisor who helps
him define the course of actions, teaches on job-search methods (for instance, ré-
sumé writing), provides logistic support, proposes job oﬀers or interviews, contacts
directly employers and so on. Some actions can be group-based.
• Finally, Project support (“Objectif projet” and similar schemes) is aimed at indi-
viduals who wish or have to change profession, but need time and help to define a
new employment project. It also lasts 3 months during which the unemployed per-
son has frequent contacts with a personal adviser. The objective of this scheme is
similar to Project assessment but there are important diﬀerences. Project support
is intended for lower ability workers who have stronger diﬃculties with the labor
market and need regular and lasting follow-up. In some cases a placement in the
workplace, lasting up to several days or weeks, is scheduled.
Only 17% of the unemployment spells in our data are associated with participation
to at least one of these four programs over the whole period 2001-2004. This relatively
low figure results partly from the fact that some spells end very rapidly (nearly 20% of
spells end in the first month of unemployment). A large majority of spells with treatment
(80%) receive only one treatment. Among this group, job-search support is by far the
2These groups have been defined with the help of the ANPE statistics and research Department and
they are homogenous in terms of objectives, targetting and length.
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most frequent measure (44%). Figure 1 describes the (monthly) empirical hazards for
transition into the schemes. The chances to enter each scheme are typically below 1%
per month, with Job-search support being provided more often. This will prove very
important for the identification strategy because, with such a low rate, it is unlikely that
treatment can be anticipated by potential beneficiaries. Strong peaks are present and
they are related to compulsory interviews on the first, 6th and 12th months, but the
entry rate remains positive at all dates and does not decline strongly in the long-run.
Although it benefits a limited number of persons, the burden of this program is
significant because of high unit costs. The figures in Table 1 relate to the marginal costs
of the services. The compulsory meetings with a caseworker have small unit cost, but
they are very numerous. Workshop is a light service that is frequently provided and
is not evaluated in this paper (it is aimed at individuals who experience only selective
problems with their job-search and lasts 1/2 day each).
Skill assessment has a small weight, whereas Project assessment costs almost 900
euros and takes a large share of the budget, although its access is limited. The unit
cost of Job-search and Project support is between 300 and 700 euros and they are more
often provided. In 2003, ANPE has spent about 440 million euros on these two support
schemes, which is the major share of the budget.
Overall, the schemes that are evaluated in this paper thus amount to 600 million
euros, approximately 0.04% of GDP, which is a considerable amount for a program that
benefits less than a fifth of the unemployed. This is about 20% of the total cost of public
employment services and administration.3 It is limited however, compared to the cost of
the whole active labor market policy, which amounts to 1.25% of GDP (OECD, 2004).
3 Economic interpretation of treatments
Three out of the four treatments (Skill assessment, Project assessment and Project sup-
port) aim at improving the adequacy between the worker’s own capability and the kind
of job she is searching. For instance, the oﬃcial objectives of Project support include:
”Know oneself better”, ”Know one’s labor market environment better”, ”Arbitrage be-
tween one’s own aspiration and capabilities and the state of the labor market”. The
assignment literature provides the relevant theoretical background to conceptualize such
policies, as it is attentive to worker and job heterogeneity and to the possibility that
some workers have a comparative advantage on some jobs (Sattinger, 1993). In such
models, better sorting individuals into jobs has economic value and several recent papers
have reconsidered unemployment benefits as a search subsidy that helps the worker get
a suitable job (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999, Teulings and Gautier, 2004). Much of the
program considered here can be understood analogously. Some unemployed workers may
have an imperfect notion of the content of jobs and the fit with their own capabilities:
caseworkers help them find out this valuable information.
3According OECD, this category includes activities of job placement, counseling and vocational guid-
ance, administrating unemployment benefits, and refeering job-seekers to availbale slots on labour market
programs.
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The Job-search support scheme simply improves the eﬃciency of search. This is
traditionally understood as aﬀecting job oﬀer arrival rates, but this has an impact on
the quality of accepted jobs (van den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006, Fougère, Pradel
and Roger, 2004).
In that section, we illustrate the important fact that evaluating such schemes based
on unemployment duration alone can be very misleading. To fix ideas, consider a simple
model where workers are characterized by specific capabilities s and job characteristics
are measured by c. There is some distribution of both variables in the economy. The
quality of a match between a type s worker and a type c job is measured by some
function m(s, c). Following Moen (1997), assume that the unemployed concentrate their
search in a submarket. The value of search in submarket c for worker type s depends
on the arrival rate of job oﬀers p(m(s, c), c), the (unique) wage w(m(s, c), c) and the job
destruction rate, q(m(s, c), c). In partial equilibrium, all three functions are assumed
exogenous. They depend on m(s, c) because more adequate workers may be oﬀered a
job more often, at a higher wage and with lower risk of destruction. They are also direct
functions of c because some jobs or some sectors may have diﬀerent values of p, w and q
for any match quality. This leaves open the possibility of arbitrage between high wage-
low job oﬀers submarkets, high job oﬀers-high destruction rates submarkets, and so on.
Finally, we note λ an eﬃciency search parameter that represents the Job-search support
policy. With r the discount factor, b unemployment benefit, VU (s, c) and VE(s, c) the
values of search and employment respectively, we have:
rVU (s, c) = b+ λp(m(s, c), c) [VE(s, c)− VU (s, c)]
rVE(s, c) = w(m(s, c), c) + q(m(s, c), c) [VU (s, c)− VE(s, c)]
The value of search is then given by:
rVU (s, c) = b+ α(m(s, c), c) [w(m(s, c), c)− b]
with:
α(m(s, c), c) =
λp(m(s, c), c)
r + q(m(s, c), c) + λp(m(s, c), c)
Type s workers chooses submarket c so as to maximize VU (s, c). This determines her
transition probabilities and wage.
Now, assume that some workers have an imperfect view of their own fitness with
jobs: their decisions will be based on some inadequate function em(s, c). We interpret
the ”assignment” policies as providing them with the right function m(s, c). The im-
portant point here is that, without further structure, the eﬀect of this policy is largely
undetermined. Call ec∗(s) the job type that maximizes b+α(em(s, c), c) [w(em(s, c), c)− b]
(i.e. under the belief that matching value is em(s, c)) and c∗(s) the chosen job type under
knowledge of the true function m(s, c). By definition, VU (s, c∗(s)) ≥ VU (s,ec∗(s)). This
is the only general restriction and it implies that at least one of the three outcomes, p, w
or q, improves. Which of them improve depends on the way the change in the matching
function shifts the locus of compatible p, w and q. In particular, it may happen that,
with better knowledge, the unemployed worker optimally shifts her search towards a
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sector with less oﬀers (lower p) but more stable jobs (higher q). This is likely if improved
matching is more important to q than to p. As a result, it is important to evaluate this
kind of policy with respect to as many outcomes as possible. Analysis of unemployment-
employment transitions alone, as done in much of the labor market policy evaluation
literature, may lead to misleading results.
The same holds for Job-search support. If treatment shifts λ to λ0 > λ (and aﬀected
workers are assumed to be knowledgeable about m(s, c)), it is certainly the case that
VU (s, c∗(s|λ0)) ≥ VU (s, c∗(s|λ)). Still, this is again compatible with many changes of p,
w and q, not just an improvement of unemployment exit rates. For that policy, such
indeterminacy is not specific to this model and it also comes out in models used by van
den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006) and Fougère, Pradel and Roger (2004).
Unfortunately, we do not observe wages in the data and we can only assess the
eﬀect of treatments on transitions between employment and unemployment. Within this
model, the treatment eﬀect parameters that we estimate empirically for transition from
unemployment to employment reflect the ratio:
p(m(s, c∗(s)), c∗(s))/p(m(s,ec∗(s)),ec∗(s))
for ”assignment” treatments and:
λ0p(m(s, c∗(s|λ0)), c∗(s|λ0))/λp(m(s, c∗(s|λ)), c∗(s|λ))
for the ”job-search” treatment. For transition back from employment to unemployment,
our empirical parameters measure:
q(m(s, c∗(s)), c∗(s))/q(m(s,ec∗(s)),ec∗(s))
and:
q(m(s, c∗(s|λ0)), c∗(s|λ0))/q(m(s, c∗(s|λ)), c∗(s|λ))
respectively. We either compute averages over the distribution of s or make the eﬀects
vary with some observed individual characteristics that capture some of the variation in
s.
One must be careful, however, not to interpret transitions for the untreated as the
transition rate that would be observed if the policy was not implemented at all. By
altering market frictions and the quality of the matches, the policy does modify the
general equilibrium of the labor market, in particular wages and job-creation, and all
outcomes are potentially diﬀerent with and without the policy. Following most of the
microeconometric evaluation literature, we do not attempt to build the corresponding
general equilibrium counterfactuals. Yet, notice that even in the short-run, that is before
market tension adjusts in equilibrium, the policy does not necessarily improve treated
outcome at the cost of the untreated (the so-called ”displacement” eﬀect), because, for
a given level of demand, better assignment can improve everyone’s outcome at a time.
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4 Data and descriptive analysis
The empirical analysis is based on longitudinal data extracted from ANPE records. We
use a 1/12 nationally representative sample of all unemployed persons4 and we sample
all inflow spells between July 2001 and September 2003 but retain only the first spell
observed on this period per individual, so as to avoid correlation of unobservables over
consecutive spells. Data end in June 2004 and unemployment spells are arbitrarily
truncated at 900 days because information becomes very poor after that duration. The
data contain a large number of individual characteristics and unemployment history
can be traced because individual data is available back to 1993. As emphasized by
Heckman et al. (1997), controlling for individual labor market history is of central
importance. We retain the following characteristics: gender, nationality, children, marital
status, educational level, age, region of residence, reason of entry into unemployment,
unemployment history (cumulative unemployment duration since July 1993 and since
July 1999), unemployment recurrence (number of spells since July 1999), welfare transfer
(RMI) and type of unemployment benefit eligibility.5
Entry into and exit from unemployment are recorded on a daily basis, so that we
model duration in continuous time. In this data, unemployment diﬀers from the ILO
conventional notion, in the sense that people are recorded as job seekers as long as
they report so to ANPE on a monthly filled form, even if they have held occasional or
short-term jobs, which they have to declare. Some unemployed are classified as “not
immediately available” because they suﬀer from health problems or cannot immediately
drop their current occupation to take a job: the corresponding spells are not kept in the
sample, as well as that of the handicapped. We also truncate spells when the unemployed
reaches 55.
Transitions may occur towards other destinations than employment but they will
be treated as censoring, which implies that they depend upon a disjoint subset of pa-
rameters. Although undesirable in some instances, this hypothesis maintains tractable
estimation. "Other destinations" include training, illness, inactivity and, most impor-
tantly, subsidized public employment. In addition, some unemployed (about 20%) do
not send their monthly form at some point so that they are known to exit but the desti-
nation is unobserved. Therefore, estimation must be limited to individuals with known
exit.6
ANPE also provided data on the services that benefitted each unemployed worker,
with a date for the eﬀective beginning of the scheme. This has been matched with
the data on unemployment spells. As reported in Table 2, the sample that is used in
4The sample consists of all individuals born on March of an even year or October of an odd year.
This sample, named “Fichier historique statistique” is updated routinely by ANPE.
5 In France, the period of entitlement to unemployment benefit is conditional on the length of the last
employment spell and on age. The type of UB scheme refers to the length of the entitlement period. The
data does not include any information about the amount of unemployment benefit paid to the individual.
6This assumes exogeneity of monthly declaration with respect to realizations of transitions. As the
model is entirely conditional on observed and unobserved constant heterogeneity (see next section), this
is a mild hypothesis.
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estimation contains 390, 945 spells, among which 56, 784 receive some treatment. Less
than half the transitions is toward employment: as a result, the sample that provides
information on recurrence is much smaller and the number of treatments is more limited
(15, 419). We will see below that this puts a limit to specification flexibility in this part
of the analysis.
The transitions into the schemes have already been described in Section 2. Table 3
indicates that assignment is certainly not random. Column 1 gives some statistics on
the characteristics of individuals who receive no treatment while columns 2 to 5 contain
the same information for individuals who have received treatment. Women receive a
treatment more often, especially of the project type, probably because their attachment
to the labor market is weaker. Education has varying eﬀects: those who benefit Projet
assessment are more educated, whereas Skill assessment and Project support are more
targeted to intermediary levels. Generally, schemes are less often provided to younger
individuals. Being on Welfare has some positive eﬀect as well as receiving unemploy-
ment benefit. Finally, having experienced other unemployment spells (since July 1999)
increases the likelihood to receive a treatment. This general picture is robust to inclusion
of these and additional variables into entirely specified duration models (see Table 5).
When a transition from unemployment to employment takes place, we define an “em-
ployment duration” as the time until the individual is back to reported unemployment.
Because sampling is based on individuals and not spells, we are certain to observe the
individual again in that case. Strictly speaking, the person may not have been in employ-
ment all the time, so it is proper to consider that we measure more exactly recurrence.
With respect to the explicit objectives of ANPE schemes, this is an important dimension.
Figure 2 displays the empirical hazard rates of the transitions to employment and
unemployment. As usual, the unemployment-employment transition exhibits a decreas-
ing pattern with a small increase at one year that may be due to specific employment
policies, including those considered here. The same pattern is found for the employment-
unemployment transition, with peaks at 3, 6 and 12 months that may be related to
standard contract duration.
5 Measuring the causal eﬀect of counseling in a duration
model framework
Access to treatments is likely non-random and is based on the caseworker decision and
the unemployed agreement. Both depend on observed and unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) characteristics. In a duration framework, it is possible to identify separately
the causal eﬀect of treatment on subsequent duration and the distribution of unobserved
characteristics, although both contribute to observed correlations between durations.
Abbring and van den Berg (2003) provide identification conditions for the mixed pro-
portional hazards model, based on earlier literature (Elbers and Ridder, 1982, Heckman
and Honoré, 1989, Honoré, 1993). Identification is non-parametric, in the sense that no
functional form must be assumed for the baseline hazards or the multivariate distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, it does not require exclusion restrictions. Ab-
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bring and van den Berg show that the elapsed duration until treatment contains useful
information to disentangle the causal eﬀect from the eﬀect induced by selection on unob-
servables. The competing hazards model until entry in a treatment or exit to employment
- whichever occurs first - identifies the joint distribution of unobservables. The remain-
ing duration identifies the causal eﬀect of the treatment. The exact timing of events
is important because the causal eﬀect is revealed by the change in the unemployment-
employment transition hazard rate that occurs once treatment is received (if treatment
is eﬀective). This can be distinguished from unobserved heterogeneity because the latter
is assumed constant over a spell. In contrast, if unobserved shocks occurred along the
spell and their timing was correlated with that of treatment, this identification would
fail. Arguably, even if this possibility cannot be excluded, controlling for population
heterogeneity still goes a long way towards reducing potential bias.
Identification requires that the durations until treatment vary suﬃciently. It implies
that we should observe individuals at many dates of entry into treatment. As shown in
Figure 1, this condition is fulfilled in our data. Even if there are peaks around compulsory
meetings (at 0, 6, 12 months), entry rates into the various treatments remain positive at
all times, because individuals or caseworkers can request interviews more often than the
legal requirement. It is also required that unemployed individuals do not anticipate the
exact date at which they will enter into a particular program. Otherwise, the program
could have some eﬀect before actual participation.7 Such an anticipation is very unlikely
within the PAP scheme, because the average monthly probability to enter a scheme is
almost always well below 1% (see Figure 1), due to rationing. Even, if this is higher
for some subpopulations, it is unlikely that it can induce significant bias, because the
decision to send an unemployed worker to a program depends greatly on the agent in
charge and on the number of slots available. Besides, the time between the prescription
of a program and its eﬀective start is very short in principle, preventing anticipation
behaviour.
In this section, we present the statistical model used to identify the causal eﬀect of
treatment on our data. We first present the benchmark model based on Abbring and
van den Berg (2003), then extend it to account for unemployment recurrence.
5.1 Benchmark model
The empirical model distinguishes the four treatment schemes presented above, indexed
by P ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Employment is an absorbing state for the moment. Individuals
enter unemployment and may exit to one of the treatments or to employment, whichever
occurs first. Because we restrict the sample to spells with at most one treatment, people
in one of the treatments may then only exit to employment (before censoring). We model
the assignment to treatment as a competing risk model. The causal eﬀect of treatment
is defined as a shift in the hazard of the transition toward employment, once treatment
has started. This eﬀect may depend on observed characteristics of individuals and may
7A neat example of anticipation is provided by Black et al. (2003) for the Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services system in Kentuky.
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vary with elapsed duration since entry into treatment.
Call tU total unemployment duration and tP the duration until treatment (for individ-
uals without treatment, tU = tP ); x is a set of observed variables and v = (vU,v1,v2,v3,v4)
is the vector of unobserved characteristics that govern transition from unemployment to
employment and transitions to each of the treatments. The conditional hazard rates for
transition to each treatment k as function of time since unemployed are:
hk(t|x, vk) = θk(t)ψk(x)vk, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
where the functions θk (.) and ψk (.) represent respectively the baseline hazard and the
eﬀect of observed characteristics on the conditional hazard. The joint distribution of the
duration to treatment and the received treatment is:
f (t, P |x, v) =
"
4Y
k=1
hk(t|x, vk)1(P=k)
#
4Y
k=1
Sk (t|x, vk)
where Sk (t|x, vk) = exp
³
−
R t
0 hk(s|x, vk)ds
´
is a survival function; the probability that
no treatment has been received up to a duration t is the product of the survival functions,
as they are (conditionally) independent.
The hazard rate of transitions from unemployment to employment, conditional on
the set of observed and unobserved characteristics, received treatment P and duration
tP until treatment is:
hU (t|tP , P, x, vU ) = θU (t)ψU (x)vU
4Y
k=1
[δk(t− tP )ϕk (x)]1(P=k)
The term within square brackets captures the treatment causal eﬀect. It may shift
the hazard rate diﬀerently according to individual characteristics (ϕk (.)) and time since
treatment (δk(.)). The simplest case is when δk(t− tP )ϕk (x) = exp (bk), which we label
the constant eﬀect model. The corresponding survival function is SU (t|tP , P, x, vU ) =
exp
³
−
R t
0 hU (s|tP , P, x, vU )ds
´
.
Because in general unobserved heterogeneity (v1,v2,v3,v4) may be correlated with vU ,
we have to model jointly the durations tU and tP as well as P. Let denote c(U) = 1
when the unemployment spell is not censored and c(U) = 0 when it is. The full density
of endogenous observations L (tU , tP , P |x, v) can be computed from the conditional and
marginal densities f(tU |tP , P, x, v) and f (tP , P |x, v), enabling us to write the contribu-
tions to the likelihood, accounting for censored durations, as:
L (tU , tP , P |x, v) =
"
hU (tU |tP , P, x, vU )
4Y
k=1
hk(tP |x, vk)1(P=k)
#c(U)
×
SU (tU |tP , P, x, vU )
4Y
k=1
Sk (tP |x, vk)
To compute the joint distribution of endogenous variables conditional on the observ-
ables only, we have to integrate out the unobserved terms. The likelihood is therefore:
L (tU , tP , P |x) =
Z
L (tU , tP , P |x, v) dG (v)
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where G (v) is the mixture distribution. Identification of θk (.), ψk (.), δk(.) ϕk (.), for
k = 1 . . . 4, θU (.), ψU (.), and G(.) follows from Abbring and van den Berg (2003).
5.2 Introducing employment duration
In our data, individuals enter, exit and sometimes reenter unemployment. We con-
sider as an ”employment” spell, a spell that begins with an exit from unemployment
to employment. The duration of the spell is known when the individual reenters unem-
ployment, otherwise the spell is censored. Because it is unsure that a job has been held
during the whole period, recall that the hazard of the transition from ”employment” to
unemployment is, strictly speaking, a measure of recurrence.
The hazard rate of employment duration is:
hE(t|P, x, vE) = θE(t)ψE(x)vE
4Y
k=1
[γk (x)]
1(P=k)
The causal eﬀect of treatment k on employment duration is γk (x), and may depend on
covariates x. Other notations are obvious. For individuals that exit from unemployment
to employment, the likelihood involves an additional term which is the likelihood of the
employment spell:
LE (tE, |P, x, vE) = hE(t|P, x, vE)c(E) exp
µ
−
Z t
0
hE(s|P, x, vE)ds
¶
where c(E) = 1 when the employment spell is not censored and c(E) = 0 otherwise. The
total conditional likelihood is now:
L (tU , tP , tE, P |x, v) = LE (tE , |P, x, vE)c(U) L (tU , tP , P |x, v)
It must also be integrated over the distribution of unobserved terms, enlarged to
(vU , vE, v1,v2,v3,v4). The Appendix provides a sketch of the demonstration that this
distribution, as well as the additional terms θE(.), ψE(.) and γk (.), are also identified,
using identification results from successive durations models.
5.3 Specification issues
A joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity with a completely flexible covariance
matrix would be very diﬃcult to estimate in practice, as the number of parameters is
very large. We choose to model the distribution as a two-factor loading model, assuming
that there are two fundamental unobserved factors V1 and V2 that enter every duration.
The specification of the unobserved terms is thus:
vk = exp(α
1
kV1 + α
2
kV2)
Let Γ a 6× 2 matrix formed by the coeﬃcients α1k, α2k. The log-unobserved terms are
therefore w = log(v) = ΓV , with V = (V1, V2) . The covariance matrix of w is:
V ar (w) = ΓV ar (V )Γ0
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The two-factor loading specification imposes no constraint on the correlation matrix, but
identification requires some normalization. Clearly for any 2× 2 orthogonal matrix8 Q :
V ar (w) = ΓV ar (V )Γ0 = ΓQ0QV ar (QV )Q0QΓ0. Thus, if Γ and V ar (V ) are solutions,
then ΓQ0 and V ar (QV ) are also solutions. This problem can be avoided by assuming
that the two underlying factors are uncorrelated and by imposing a restriction on Γ,
namely α2k = 0 for some k. A frequent and natural choice is to model the unobserved
factors as a discrete distribution with mass points, following Heckman and Singer (1984),
and interpret it as an approximation to a non-parametric distribution. We assume
that V1 and V2 are independent and are both distributed on the support {−1, 1} with
distinct probabilities. The information contained in V ar (w) is suﬃcient to identify the
11 parameters in Γ and the two probabilities. Therefore, no additional constraints are
required to normalize the means.
All model parameters are in exponential form. In particular, we model the contribu-
tion of explanatory variables as:
ψk(x) = exp (xβk)
The explanatory variables we introduce are of two types. The first type includes
variables like gender, age, education, region of residence, nationality, children, marital
status. These can reasonably be considered exogenous. The second type of conditioning
variables (note it xp) is based on past labor market history: reason for entry into un-
employment, unemployment recurrence, welfare transfer, unemployment benefit track.
They are functions of passed values of endogenous variables, which may generate correla-
tion with unobserved heterogeneity. However, this is not an issue here, as the treatment
parameters are still consistently estimated if we specify unobserved heterogeneity con-
ditional on observed covariates rather than the opposite. Assume that the unobserved
terms are in fact vk = exp(xpρkp+α
1
kV1+α
2
kV2): it is clear that the parameters ρ cannot
be disentangled from the parameters β, but this does not aﬀect the consistency of the
parameters δ and γ of main interest.9
Flexibility of the baseline hazard is limited by the practical diﬃculties in estimating
it jointly with the unobserved heterogeneity distribution (Baker and Melino, 2000). We
adopt a piecewise constant hazard for the duration dependence functions θk(t), of the
form:
θk (t) =
l=LX
l=1
eθkl1 (t ∈ Il)
For unemployment duration, we allow for seven intervals, the first six of them being of
equal length of 90 days, i.e. covering the first one and a half year of unemployment: I1 =
[1, 90] , I2 = [91, 180] , I3 = [181, 270] , I4 = [270, 360] , I5 = [361, 450] , I6 = [451, 540] ,
8An orthogonal matrix satisfies QQ0 = I.
9This is in the spirit of Wooldridge’s (2002) treatment of initial condition in a panel setup. He
proposes to model the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity conditional on the first observation and
use it to derive the density of observations. In contrast to this approach, however, we do not aim to
recover all structural parameters.
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I7 = [541, 900[ . For all other durations, we set five intervals, the first four of them lasting
90 days I1 = [1, 90] , I2 = [91, 180] , I3 = [181, 270] , I4 = [270, 360] , I5 = [361, 900].
Because local maxima are likely, we run optimization a number of times with ran-
domly chosen starting values. The tolerance for the gradient was set to 10−6 and we used
Gauss optmum library with the BFGS algorithm in order to be able to deal with the
very large number of observations and parameters . Analytical gradients were used to
speed-up optimization and to avoid imprecision in the Hessian computation. Out of, say,
fifteen sets of random starting values, most would converge to the same maximum, and
a few would converge to another set of parameters showing a lower likelihood. Having
also checked the Hessian closely, we are thus confident that the reported estimates are
at a global maximum.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Constant eﬀect model
Table 4 and 5 show the estimates of the constant eﬀect model. Table 4 reports the
treatment eﬀects and unobserved heterogeneity parameters; it also reports parameters
of a model without unobserved heterogeneity. Comparison between the two illustrates
that assuming selectivity on the observables only, as with matching methods, would
be misleading in some instances. Table 5 contains the estimated eﬀects of duration
dependance and individual characteristics on the transition rate from unemployment to
work, from employment back to unemployment and to each of the counseling schemes.
True duration dependence (Table 5) is graphed in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 describes
the estimated duration dependence of the hazards into the schemes. As in the empirical
hazard rates (see Figure 1), we observe peaks related to compulsory interviews at 0, 6
and 12 months. Figure 4 displays the estimated duration dependence of the hazard rates
of exits to employment and to unemployment. They are flatter than their empirical
counterparts (Figure 2), as a result for accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. The
unemployment-employment transition exhibits a non-monotonic true duration depen-
dence, decreasing slightly over the first 9 months of unemployment then increasing after
12 month and decreasing again. The employment-unemployment transition exhibits a
more pronounced U-shape pattern, first increasing over the first 9 months of unemploy-
ment and then deceasing. After 12 months of employment, the hazard rate has dropped
by 40%. Peaks at 6 and 12 months may be related to standard contract duration.
Heterogeneity parameters are precisely estimated and the distribution of heterogene-
ity is balanced, with the four types defined by the combination of the values of (V 1, V 2)
representing 40%, 33%, 15% and 12% of the population. The higher loading factor for
all processes, but unemployment duration, is for the same heterogeneity component, V 1:
this implies that a significant share of correlations between durations can be attributed
to unobserved factors. The eﬀects of covariates are also precisely estimated and they are
in line with the descriptive statistics of Table 3. Notice that the cohort eﬀect obviously
captures the cycle: cohorts entering at the end of the period have longer unemployment
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and shorter employment duration.
We now turn to the eﬀects of treatments on the transition rate from unemployment
to work. When unobserved heterogeneity is not allowed for, Skill assessment and Job-
search support have a positive and significant impact on the exit rate towards work
(column1, Table 4). A negative but small impact is found for Project assessment, and
Skill assessment has no impact. Introducing correlated unobserved heterogeneity changes
some of these results (column 2, Table 4). In particular, the eﬀect of the Job-search
support program reinforces strongly: the transition rate of individuals attending this
scheme increases by about 73% (exp(0.55) − 1) instead of 46% in the model with no
unobserved heterogeneity. The causal eﬀect of Skill assessment is more limited (27%).
The negative eﬀect of Project support is small (−12%). Generally, in this constant eﬀect
specification, Project-type schemes have non-significant or negative eﬀects, something
that we will be able to interpret below.
Regarding the eﬀects of counseling on transitions from employment back to unem-
ployment, we observe striking diﬀerences whether the model allows or not for selection
on unobservables. With no unobserved heterogeneity, most eﬀects are positive but small
(6 to 14%). The picture is reversed when allowing for correlated unobserved heterogene-
ity, implying strong selectivity into treatment. All schemes have strong causal eﬀects, as
they decrease recurrence by 49 to 58%.10 It is important to emphasize that, because sub-
sidized public employment is not considered among the work exits (and is treated among
”other destinations”), this result is not driven by the relatively long average length of
the subsidized jobs.
The nature of selectivity into the treatments is detailed in Table 6. Because the
estimated correlation between unobserved heterogeneity terms is sensitive to included
covariates, only total heterogeneity correlation is relevant to economic interpretation.
It is computed as corr(ψi(x)vi, ψj(x)vj), i, j ∈ {U,E, 1, 2, 3, 4} in the population and
is displayed on the top panel. All treatments, but Project support, are provided more
intensely to individuals who have ex-ante lower unemployment-employment transition
rates. Those negative correlations are rather small, however, leading to limited selectivity
eﬀect. The higher unobserved contribution is for Job-search support and this is indeed
where the causal eﬀect is most aﬀected by selectivity correction in Table 4. Along the
same logic, but with much stronger correlations, treatments are provided to individuals
who are more at risk of recurrence. This is driven by unobserved heterogeneity: corre-
lation are all above 0.9 because, in the factor loading approximation to the distribution
of v, only one factor happens to be significant for vE.
The direction of selectivity provides insights on program implementation. It can be
considered that ANPE caseworkers are eﬀective in selecting individuals who need treat-
ment in the sense that they are particularly at risk of unemployment and recurrence,
and this is why favorable treatment eﬀects are underestimated when unobserved het-
erogeneity is not taken into account. This is important, because the caseworkers could
be tempted to adopt the opposite strategy, so as to provide the illusion that they are
10These eﬀects are not altered when employment duration is allowed to depend on previous unemploy-
ment duration (tU ).
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eﬃcient (or the institution is). In the case of recurrence into unemployment, it seems
that caseworkers select individuals who have basic characteristics - such as education
and age - that make them able to succeed on the labor market (as witnessed by negative
correlation of observed heterogeneity), but have specific personal or motivation problems
or bad knowledge of the labor market (unobserved to us) that require some intensive
help.
6.2 Heterogenous eﬀects model
In Table 7, we allow treatment eﬀects to vary with some selected individual character-
istics, with date of entry into unemployment and with time elapsed since treatment.11
Significant heterogeneity of the eﬀects is found only for the unemployment-employment
transition; obviously, there is not enough information on employment duration for this
very data-demanding section. We thus only comment the upper panel of Table 7. The
most striking feature is the retention eﬀect: Project assessment and Project support have
a negative eﬀect (for the reference person) immediately after treatment has started, as
in the constant eﬀect model. But we now allow this eﬀect to change after three months:
it becomes positive, with a net eﬀect of 25% and 19% respectively (at the reference indi-
vidual, pertaining to the early 2002 cohort). This is perfectly coherent with the function
of these schemes: they are meant to build up a professional project and a search strategy
before intensive search actually takes place. Because they last up to 3 months, reten-
tion eﬀect is apparent during this period. Then, search becomes more eﬃcient for the
treated. Interestingly, Job-search support does not display such a feature, which is in
accordance with its purpose, as described in Section 2. Overall, the orders of magnitude
of the treatment eﬀects on transitions towards employment are comparable with those
found in the UK by Dolton and O’Neill (1996) for the Restart program and by Blundell
et al. (2004) for the New Deal (about 20− 30%).
All schemes are particularly eﬃcient for the treated with some unemployment expe-
rience, a category that indeed more often receives the schemes (see Table 5). Assessment
schemes are more eﬃcient for the young, probably because new entrants are less informed
and need help to fit their search strategy with the labor demand. However, the young
are less often provided these treatments (Table 5). In contrast, Job-search support seems
useful to more experienced persons as well as to more educated ones. It is indeed pro-
vided to more educated, but not to the older. Perhaps surprisingly, the educated also
benefit more from Project support, but they receive it less often. Overall, correlations
between treatment propensity and treatment eﬃciency are negative.12 We compute them
as corr(ψk(x), ϕk (x)), k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} where ψk(x) is the covariate contribution to the
hazard rate into treatment and ϕk (x) is from Table 7 (excluding month of entry and
the incremental eﬀect, so as to concentrate on individual heterogeneity). Correlations
are: −0.38 for Skill assessment, −0.42 for Project assessment, −0.15 for Search support
and −0.23 for Project support. This implies that, as far as observed heterogeneity is
11The rest of the model is close to Tables 4 and 5 and is not reported.
12This is similar to Black et al. (2003).
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concerned, the schemes are not allocated to those who benefit them the most. Arguably,
unobserved determinants may be present and be more decisive. Furthermore, we no-
ticed that the schemes are oﬀered to those who need them more, in the sense that their
unemployment risk is higher: these persons may not also show the highest treatment
eﬀects.
Finally, treatment eﬀects vary very strongly according to the date of entry into un-
employment: they are lower for those entered at the end of the period (September 2003)
that for those entered at reform starting time (July 2001). For instance, the point-
estimate eﬀect of Job-search support can switch from 165% to 61% for the reference
individual, and that of Project support, from 52% to 6%. This finding can be driven by
several factors. The rise in the number of participants since the launch of the program
could reduce its beneficial eﬀect if displacement plays a significant role. This could also
reflect a maturation eﬀect (see Blundell et al., 2004): the caseworkers are less involved in
the project two years after the launch of the program than they initially were. Finally,
the eﬀect of counseling schemes can be sensitive to the state of the labour market and
decrease in a recession.
All these results are compatible with the analysis of Section 3 and with the nature
of the various schemes. The intensive Job-search support has strong eﬀects on both
unemployment and employment durations, implying that improved search eﬃciency has
general impacts on search strategy. As could be expected, the ”assignment” schemes
have stronger eﬀects on employment duration than on unemployment duration: favor-
ing assignment-eﬃcient search strategy acts primarily on the quality of jobs, but not
necessarily at the cost of longer search. Finally, the lighter scheme, Skill assessment,
has no eﬀect on unemployment duration, but still has some eﬀect (the smallest one) on
employment duration, something that is again compatible with theory.
7 Simulations
The parameters presented above are diﬃcult to interpret directly because the absolute
eﬀects on exit rates depend on the baseline value of the hazard function and, when
heterogeneous eﬀects are considered, on the distribution of covariates. We quantify the
eﬀects of the schemes by way of simulations.
We first compute a set of parameters that are similar to the ”treatment on the
treated” used in the evaluation literature. We first examine how exit rates towards em-
ployment shift after treatment has been received. Decompose the entire unemployment
duration as tU = tP + tR where tP is duration until a treatment occurs and tR is residual
duration once treatment has been received. We compute the cumulative distribution
of tR on the population that has received a given treatment. We then compute this
same cumulative, but with treatment eﬀect set to zero. Our parameter is the diﬀerence
between the two. Formally, for treatment k ∈ {1 . . . 4}:
UEk (t) =
Z
x
P (tR < t|P = k, δk(t) = bδk(t), ϕk (x) = bϕk (x))
−P (tR < t|P = k, δk(t) = 0, ϕk (x) = 0)dK(x|P = k)
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where K(x|p = k) is the empirical distribution of observed covariates in the treated
population. Implicit in the condition P = k is the fact that unemployment duration
up to treatment (tP ) is not randomly distributed: the parameter is thus evaluated on a
selected population both in terms of duration dependence and individual heterogeneity.
We define analogously a treatment on the treated parameter for employment duration:
EUk (t) =
Z
x
P (tE < t|P = k, γk (x) = bγk (x))
−P (tE < t|P = k, γk (x) = 0)dK(x|P = k)
This measures the shift in exit rate from employment back to unemployment for the
population that received a given treatment.
In order to account for the fact that only a limited share of the unemployed workers
receive a treatment, we also measure the eﬀect of the presence of the schemes on the
distributions of tU and tE in the whole population. This measures the impact of treat-
ments altogether with the intensity of assignment to the treatments. Because of that,
the starting date is now entry into unemployment (and no longer entry into treatment).
The statistics is simply:
UE(t) =
X
k
P (tk < t, P = k)
Z
x
P (tU < t|P = k, δk(t) = bδk(t), ϕk (x) = bϕk (x))
−P (tU < t|P = k, δk(t) = 0, ϕk (x) = 0)dK(x|P = k)
because the diﬀerential for the untreated (tk ≥ t) is 0. Notice that this parameter
increases with t both because the share of unemployed that have exited increase with
elapsed time but also because the proportion of treated also increases. Accordingly:
EU(t) =
X
k
P (P = k)
Z
x
P (tE < t|P = k, γk (x) = bγk (x))
−P (tE < t|P = k, γk (x) = 0)dK(x|P = k)
The simplest way to measure all these parameters is to simulate the model. We first
draw a random term in the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity for each individual
in the sample. This allows us to compute the quantities ψU (x)vU , ψE(x)vE, ψk(x)vk, k =
1, . . . , 4. We then draw four independent values for the durations upon each treatment,
i.e. draws in the distribution of t1 to t4 conditional on x and v.13 The duration to
potential treatment is tP = min (t1, t2, t3, t4) and P = argmin (t1, t2, t3, t4) . We then
draw in the distribution of tU conditional on x, vU and tP .14 The duration dependence is
now a function of duration to potential treatment. Once this duration is drawn, we can
define the actual duration to treatment, which is censored if exit to employment happens
13To this aim, we must take the inverse of the survival function Sk (x, t) = exp
³
−ψk(x)vk
R t
0
θk (s) ds
´
.
This is simply the solution of
R t
0
θk (s) ds = ln (1− uk) /ψk(x)vk, with uk a draw in the uniform [0, 1]
distribution.
14This is performed along the same lines : we draw a random number in the uniform distribution and
solve
R t
0
θU (s, tP ) ds = ln (1− uU ) /ψU (x)vU .
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before treatment (tU < tP ). Simulation of the employment duration is performed in a
similar way. In the end, every observation is given a sequence of durations, which is not
the observed one, but is compatible with estimated joint distributions. This is done again
with the eﬀects parameters set to zero. It is important to recall that these simulations
provide a synthetic view of the estimated eﬀects, but they are not simulations in the
general equilibrium sense.
In order to account for the precision of the estimators, we make these simulations
again several hundred times, each time with a diﬀerent draw into the normal distribution
of the entire vector of parameters, using its estimated variance-covariance. The dashed
lines in Figures 5 and 6 provide the corresponding 5% and 95% confidence intervals.
Figures 5a to 5d present the parameters UEk (t) (labelled "exit to employment")
and EUk (t) ("exit to unemployment") for each of the four schemes. Consider first exit
to employment. The baseline exit cumulative is not presented in the figures: it is to
the order of 30% after 18 months and it reaches about 40% after 900 days. Treatments
thus have strong impacts: the share of the unemployed that has exited to a job at some
point after treatment increases by up to 5 percentage points for assessment schemes, 10
percentage points for Job-search support and 3 percentage points for Project support,
under the eﬀect of treatment. As soon as 5 months after treatment, Job-search support
increases by 4 points the proportion that has found a job. The retention eﬀect of the
two project schemes is also visible in the figures.
The baseline order of magnitude of recurrence is 30% after 6 months and 70% after
900 days (this rapidly increasing cumulative function is typical of the specific population
that benefits more often from treatment). Its shape is strongly aﬀected by the schemes:
as compared to the rates that would be observed in the absence of any treatment eﬀect,
recurrence is 17 to 25 points lower after 900 days and as much as 7 to 15 percentage
points lower after only 6 months.
Figure 6 presents parameters UE(t) and EU(t). They account both for the eﬀects
of all four treatments altogether and for treatment intensity. Therefore, they measure
the overall impact of the money spent on the program. Because less than one fifth of
the population receives a schemes at some point, eﬀects are much smaller. They remain
significant, however. Due to retention eﬀects and to the fact that schemes are provided
progressively, the impact on exit to employment increases very slowly. After a year the
gain is only half a percentage point and it reaches one point only after two years. The
impact on exit to unemployment increases faster: the program reduces overall recurrence
by 7 points (from 33% to 26%) after only one year.
8 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the causal eﬀects of job search assistance schemes that became
central in the public unemployment services since the July 2001 reform in France. Al-
though this is only one dimension of this reform, it is a major innovation in the national
context, with substantial budgetary eﬀort, and one that lacks systematic evaluation in
the literature. Moreover, several schemes aim at favoring search strategies that enhance
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the assignment of workers to jobs. This type of intervention may decrease unemployment
duration but would more surely lower unemployment recurrence. The latter aspect is not
routinely considered in the literature, although it has major implications for employment
levels in the long run.
The available database makes estimation of those eﬀects possible using identification
results that rely only on duration information. Because the data is large, we can exploit
all the flexibility that is available within this class of models, making the eﬀects of the
treatment depend on elapsed time and observed individual characteristics, even for a
large number of potential treatments.
Generally, schemes are provided more often to those that need them the most, in
the sense that their risk of long-term unemployment or recurrence is high. The schemes
considered are found to have some impact on unemployment and employment duration.
However, the magnitude of the impact is much larger on recurrence than on unemploy-
ment duration, especially for ”assignment” schemes. Among the four counseling schemes
analysed, the Job-search support program, which receives the largest financial eﬀort from
the public employment services, has the strongest eﬀects overall. There is a retention
eﬀect on the “assignment” schemes that is consistent with their design. Heterogeneity of
the eﬀects is present in some instances and the eﬃciency of the schemes decreases with
calendar time, to which the economic cycle probably contributes.
Treatment on the treated eﬀects are large, but the overall eﬀect is more limited given
that only a small fraction of the unemployed receive treatment. This observation calls
for a systematic cost-benefit analysis that cannot be implemented with the current data,
because information on wages and the amount of unemployment benefits is lacking. Also,
possible general equilibrium eﬀect and displacement eﬀects are not assessed. However,
this analysis contributes to the evidence that counseling schemes are central to active
labor market policies.
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Appendix
Consider the trivariate model (tU , tP , tE) for total unemployment duration, duration
until (a unique) treatment and employment duration respectively. We observe:(
(tU , tP , tE) if tU > tP
(tU , tE) if tU ≤ tP
Following notations in text, hazard rates are:
θU (tU )ψU (x)vU [δ]
1(tU>tP )
θP (tP )ψP (x)vP
θE(tE)ψE(x)vE [γ (x)]
1(tU>tP )
We assume identifications conditions as required in Abbring and van den Berg (2003),
so that all unemployment and treatment hazard parameters are identified. The densities
of interest for the employment part of the model are:
f (tU , tP , tE, tU > tP |x) = θU (tU )θP (tP )θE(tE)ψU (x)ψP (x)ψE(x)δγ (x)
×Ev[vUvP vE exp(−(ZU (tP ) + δ[ZU (tU )− ZU (tP )])ψU (x)vU
−ZP (tP )ψP (x)vP − ZE(tE)ψE(x)vEγ (x))]
f (tU , tE, tU ≤ tP |x) = θU (tU )θE(tE)ψU (x)ψE(x)
×Ev[vUvE exp(−ZU (tU )ψU (x)vU
−ZP (tU )ψP (x)vP − ZE(tE)ψE(x)vE)]
where Ev[.] denotes expectancy with respect to the joint distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity (the corresponding integrals are supposed to exist) and Zk(.) are integrated
baseline hazards. We normalize ψE(x0) = 1 for some x0 and ZE(t
∗
E) = 1 for some t
∗
E .
Identification proofs closely follow Honoré (1993).
Identification of ψE(.):
Take the limit of f (tU , tE, tU ≤ tP |x) /f (tU , tE, tU ≤ tP |x0) for tU → 0 and tE → 0:
lim
tU→0
tE→0
f (tU , tE, tU ≤ tP |x)
f (tU , tE, tU ≤ tP |x0) =
ψU (x)ψE(x)
ψU (x0)ψE(x0)
Therefore ψE(x)/ψE(x0) is identified, so is ψE(x) up to a normalization.
Identification of γ (.):
Consider the observable survival function:
S (tU , tP , tE, tU > tP |x) = Ev[exp(−(ZU (tP ) + δ[ZU (tU )− ZU (tP )])ψU (x)vU
−ZP (tP )ψP (x)vP − ZE(tE)ψE(x)vEγ (x))]
The derivative with respect to tE is:
∂S (tU , tP , tE, tU > tP |x)
∂tE
= −θE(tE)ψE(x)γ (x)
×Ev[vE exp(−(ZU (tP ) + δ[ZU(tU )− ZU (tP )])ψU (x)vU
−ZP (tP )ψP (x)vP − ZE(tE)ψE(x)vEγ (x))]
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Take the limit for tU → 0, tP → 0 and tE → 0 :
lim
tU→0
tE→0
∂S (tU , tE , tU > tP |x)
∂tE
= −θE(0)ψE(x)γ (x)
Accordingly for the survival on the untreated population:
lim
tU→0
tE→0
∂S (tU , tP , tE, tU ≤ tP |x)
∂tE
= −θE(0)ψE(x)
This identifies γ (x) because the rest of the model is already identified.
Identification of G:
Take observations with tU > tP . The survival function is:
S (tU , tP , tE, tU > tP |x) = Ev[exp(−(ZU (tP ) + δ[ZU (tU )− ZU (tP )])ψU (x)vU
−ZP (tP )ψP (x)vP − ZE(tE)ψE(x)vEγ (x))]
This function has the form:
K(sU , sP , sE) = Ev [exp(−vUsU − vP sP − vEsE)]
As in Honoré (1993), identification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is
based on the function K, that is the Laplace transform of G. If K can be identified on an
open set of R3, then it can be extended on all R and the distribution of G is identified.
To show that K is identified on an open set, we can consider the function
χ : (tU , tP , tE, x)→ (ZU (tP )+δ[ZU (tU )−ZU (tP )])ψU (x), ZP (tP )ψP (x), ZE(tE)ψE(x)γ (x)
Set tE = t∗E so that Z(t
∗
E) = 1. As ZU , ZP , ψU , ψP , ψE, δ and γ are identified, the
function χ is identified. Moreover, as ZU and ZP are strictly increasing and provided
there exists a variable with continuous distribution entering ψE(x), then variation in tU ,
tP , and x will span at least an open set in R3.
Identification of ZE(.):
ZE(.) is identified by letting tE vary in the survival functions, with x, tU and tP
fixed.
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Unit cost Volume Total cost 
(millions)
Share in total 
cost
Meetings 26.43 € 13 096 151 346.19 € 34%
Workshops 38.67 € 1 218 604 47.13 € 5%
Skill assessment 224.86 € 205 436 46.19 € 5%
Project assessment 881.99 € 150 926 133.12 € 13%
Search or Project support 541.69 € 810 032 438.79 € 43%
Total 65.33 € 15 481 149 1 011.41 € 100%
Source: ANPE.
Table 1: Cost and volume of the PAP schemes in 2003
Unemployment spells
total number of spells 390 945
exit to employment 146 239
exit to other destination 161 299
censoring 83 407
no treatment 334 161
Skill assessment 8 442
Project assessment 8 564
Job-search support 24 440
Project support 15 338
Employment spells
total number of spells 146 239
exit to unemployment 56 095
censoring 90 144
no treatment 130 820
Skill assessment 2 025
Project assessment 2 134
Job-search support 7 662
Project support 3 598
Table 2: Spell sample statistics
Source: FHS-ANPE, authors computation. First unemployment spell per
individual, excluding unknown destination.
Spells with no 
treatment
Skill 
assessment
Project 
assessment
Job-search 
support Project support
male 47% 43% 39% 42% 39%
female 53% 57% 61% 58% 61%
elementary school 21% 15% 8% 23% 17%
lower secondary 42% 48% 34% 42% 46%
upper secondary 17% 20% 23% 14% 19%
higher education 20% 17% 35% 22% 18%
age below 25 30% 16% 9% 22% 26%
age 25-30 20% 18% 20% 16% 20%
age 30-40 28% 36% 41% 28% 30%
age 40-50 17% 23% 23% 25% 19%
age 50-55 6% 7% 7% 10% 4%
welfare income 9% 10% 7% 14% 12%
unemployment benefit 66% 75% 79% 70% 66%
neither 25% 16% 14% 17% 23%
unemployment recurrence 47% 51% 60% 51% 56%
no recurrence 53% 49% 40% 49% 44%
Table 3: Sample individual characteristics
Source: FHS-ANPE, authors computation. First spell per individual, excluding unknown destination. 390945 spells.
coeff. sd coeff. sd
Treatment effects: Unemployment - Employment
Skill assessment 0.210 (0.022) 0.241 (0.074)
Project assessment -0.004 (0.022) -0.103 (0.067)
Job-search support 0.375 (0.012) 0.547 (0.031)
Project support -0.072 (0.017) -0.131 (0.053)
Treatment effects: Employment - Unemployment
Skill assessment -0.048 (0.040) -0.667 (0.082)
Project assessment 0.097 (0.040) -0.879 (0.067)
Job-search support 0.065 (0.021) -0.804 (0.053)
Project support 0.127 (0.029) -0.688 (0.059)
Factor loading parameters
Unemployment - Employment
α1 -0.075 (0.025)
α2 1.025 (0.013)
Employment - Unemployment
α1 0.701 (0.033)
α2 -0.048 (0.034)
Skill assessment
α1 0.844 (0.099)
α2 0.059 (0.073)
Project assessment
α1 1.927 (0.132)
α2 0.211 (0.074)
Job-search support
α1 1.389 (0.049)
α2 0.000
Project support
α1 1.263 (0.072)
α2 0.137 (0.056)
Probabilities
prob(V1=-1) 0.726 (0.031)
prob(V1=1) 0.274
prob(V2=-1) 0.447 (0.018)
prob(V2=1) 0.553
Source: FHS-ANPE. First spell per individual, excluding unknown destination. 390945 spells. Other parameters are presented
in Table 5. In bold, estimates significantly different from zero at 5%. α1 and α2 are the coefficients of the two loading factors
in each exit destination. Probabilities are the probability distribution of the two factors.
Table 4: Estimates of constant treatment effects and unobserved heterogeneity
Without UH With UH
coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd
Intercept -7.039 (0.034) -9.780 (0.097) -12.091 (0.180) -8.280 (0.080) -8.356 (0.091) -6.887 (0.048)
Duration dependence (< 3 months)
3-6 months -0.019 (0.008) -0.426 (0.035) -0.806 (0.037) -0.426 (0.021) -0.684 (0.026) 0.295 (0.013)
6-9 months -0.020 (0.011) -0.017 (0.041) -0.112 (0.040) 0.383 (0.022) -0.130 (0.031) 0.280 (0.018)
9-12 months -0.252 (0.014) -0.328 (0.056) -0.407 (0.057) 0.108 (0.031) -0.396 (0.043) -0.043 (0.024)
12-15 months (col. 1) or > 12 months (col. 2-6) -0.201 (0.017) 0.051 (0.069) 0.171 (0.066) 0.518 (0.037) -0.036 (0.052) -0.445 (0.027)
15-18 months -0.259 (0.021)
> 18 months -0.212 (0.021)
Personal characteristics
male 0.258 (0.007) -0.128 (0.025) -0.402 (0.025) -0.209 (0.016) -0.349 (0.019) -0.087 (0.010)
no children 0.007 (0.009) -0.138 (0.029) -0.017 (0.030) -0.010 (0.019) -0.046 (0.023) 0.083 (0.014)
not French -0.551 (0.013) 0.196 (0.039) -0.467 (0.054) 0.110 (0.026) -0.006 (0.032) 0.262 (0.020)
married 0.032 (0.009) 0.117 (0.028) -0.028 (0.029) -0.045 (0.018) -0.132 (0.022) -0.104 (0.013)
Education (elementary school)
higher education 0.041 (0.011) 0.166 (0.042) 1.483 (0.048) 0.178 (0.025) -0.011 (0.031) -0.374 (0.017)
upper secondary -0.098 (0.011) 0.576 (0.040) 1.347 (0.049) -0.113 (0.026) 0.243 (0.030) -0.085 (0.016)
lower secondary -0.203 (0.009) 0.447 (0.034) 0.763 (0.046) -0.031 (0.020) 0.248 (0.025) 0.033 (0.014)
Age (< 25 years)
25 to 30 years -0.306 (0.011) 0.217 (0.041) 0.840 (0.048) -0.251 (0.026) -0.021 (0.029) -0.096 (0.015)
30 to 40 years -0.359 (0.011) 0.372 (0.040) 1.234 (0.047) -0.086 (0.025) -0.004 (0.029) 0.013 (0.016)
40 to 50 years -0.455 (0.012) 0.349 (0.044) 1.288 (0.051) 0.231 (0.027) -0.024 (0.032) 0.079 (0.018)
50 to 55 years -0.377 (0.019) 0.276 (0.059) 1.030 (0.066) 0.260 (0.034) -0.297 (0.051) 0.062 (0.031)
Region of residence (Paris)
R1 (high unemployment rate) 0.056 (0.010) 0.210 (0.034) 0.366 (0.036) 0.514 (0.024) 0.213 (0.027) 0.311 (0.017)
R2 (medium unemployment rate) 0.181 (0.011) 0.028 (0.037) 0.176 (0.038) 0.420 (0.025) 0.164 (0.028) 0.342 (0.018)
R3 (low unemployment rate) 0.334 (0.010) 0.114 (0.034) 0.237 (0.035) 0.358 (0.024) 0.205 (0.027) 0.372 (0.016)
Reason of entry into unemployment (first entry)
firing 0.285 (0.015) 0.044 (0.052) 0.447 (0.061) -0.328 (0.033) -0.237 (0.037) -0.224 (0.023)
demission 0.596 (0.017) -0.047 (0.061) 0.302 (0.068) -0.323 (0.039) -0.341 (0.044) -0.143 (0.025)
end of contract 0.725 (0.013) -0.244 (0.051) -0.034 (0.060) -0.466 (0.030) -0.487 (0.035) 0.017 (0.020)
others 0.145 (0.014) -0.018 (0.047) 0.210 (0.058) -0.286 (0.028) -0.251 (0.032) -0.072 (0.021)
Unemployment history:
log of cumulative duration (standardized mean value)
since July 1993 -0.032 (0.004) -0.045 (0.013) -0.065 (0.014) -0.055 (0.010) -0.070 (0.011) 0.035 (0.006)
since July 1999 -0.646 (0.013) -0.382 (0.048) -0.648 (0.054) -0.164 (0.032) -0.543 (0.038) 0.044 (0.019)
Unemployment recurrence (1st spell since July 1999)
2nd spell since July 1999 0.922 (0.024) 0.491 (0.087) 0.771 (0.097) 0.066 (0.059) 0.624 (0.068) 0.053 (0.034)
3th spell since July 1999 1.068 (0.028) 0.596 (0.099) 0.861 (0.111) 0.114 (0.066) 0.665 (0.078) 0.159 (0.039)
> 3th spells since July 1999 1.264 (0.029) 0.641 (0.106) 0.872 (0.121) 0.126 (0.070) 0.676 (0.084) 0.376 (0.041)
Cohort effect:
log of calendar month of entry (standardized mean v -0.134 (0.004) 0.237 (0.014) 0.412 (0.018) 0.205 (0.009) 0.223 (0.011) 0.072 (0.005)
Social transfers (no RMI)
RMI -0.727 (0.014) 0.068 (0.043) -0.079 (0.050) 0.387 (0.026) 0.215 (0.031) 0.135 (0.021)
Unemployment benefits (no UB)
UB - 122 days -0.686 (0.016) -0.353 (0.065) -0.389 (0.074) -0.407 (0.039) -0.536 (0.049) 0.270 (0.020)
UB - 213 days -0.740 (0.014) -0.136 (0.050) -0.291 (0.059) -0.224 (0.032) -0.337 (0.038) 0.272 (0.019)
UB - 456 days -0.723 (0.013) -0.134 (0.050) -0.069 (0.056) -0.089 (0.031) -0.292 (0.038) 0.165 (0.018)
UB - 700 days -1.041 (0.014) 0.147 (0.046) 0.130 (0.047) 0.105 (0.031) -0.100 (0.036) 0.179 (0.024)
UB - 912 days -0.861 (0.010) -0.019 (0.038) 0.075 (0.040) -0.047 (0.024) -0.222 (0.029) 0.036 (0.014)
UB for > 50 years old -1.821 (0.026) -0.205 (0.076) 0.140 (0.080) 0.096 (0.043) -0.569 (0.066) 0.088 (0.045)
# parameters
# observations
Source: FHS-ANPE. First spell per individual, excluding unknown destination. A16Other parameters are presented in Table 4. In brackets, reference category. In
bold, estimates significantly different from zero at 5%.
Emp.-Unemp.Project supportJob-search support
Table 5: Estimated effect of duration and individual characteristics on the transition rates
390 945
Unemp.-Emp. Skill assessment Project assessment
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S Pa J Ps U E
Skill assessment (S) 1.000
Project assessment (Pa) 0.791 1.000
Job-search support (J) 0.827 0.670 1.000
Project support (Ps) 0.857 0.667 0.897 1.000
Unemployment-Employment (U) -0.107 -0.047 -0.071 0.017 1.000
Employment-Unemployment (E) 0.633 0.363 0.703 0.619 -0.117 1.000
S Pa J Ps U E
Skill assessment (S) 1.000
Project assessment (Pa) 0.663 1.000
Job-search support (J) 0.456 0.378 1.000
Project support (Ps) 0.593 0.349 0.706 1.000
Unemployment-Employment (U) -0.329 -0.209 -0.118 0.064 1.000
Employment-Unemployment (E) -0.132 -0.368 -0.071 -0.170 -0.150 1.000
S Pa J Ps U E
Skill assessment (S) 1.000
Project assessment (Pa) 0.988 1.000
Job-search support (J) 0.996 0.972 1.000
Project support (Ps) 0.996 0.998 0.986 1.000
Unemployment-Employment (U) -0.031 0.027 -0.092 0.007 1.000 -0.153
Employment-Unemployment (E) 0.986 0.951 0.997 0.969 -0.153 1.000
Observed heterogeneity
Table 6 :  Correlation between heterogeneity terms in hazard rates
Unobserved heterogeneity
Source: FHS-ANPE. Based on estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5. The modelization of individual heterogeneity in hazard rates introduces two
components, one observed and the other unobserved. The table gives the covariance matrix of these components accross exit destinations.
Total heterogeneity
coef. sd coef. sd coef. sd coef. sd
constant 0.138 (0.092) -0.256 (0.087) 0.571 (0.046) -0.016 (0.074)
log(calendar month of entry) -0.085 (0.029) -0.106 (0.034) -0.135 (0.015) -0.097 (0.022)
male -0.074 (0.054) 0.025 (0.054) 0.055 (0.029) -0.042 (0.042)
at most lower secondary degree 0.018 (0.056) -0.032 (0.055) -0.295 (0.031) -0.109 (0.042)
<30 years old 0.133 (0.057) 0.198 (0.058) -0.125 (0.031) 0.023 (0.042)
>1 unemployment spells since July 1999 0.187 (0.054) 0.139 (0.055) 0.163 (0.030) 0.133 (0.042)
incremental effect: > 3 months after treatement start 0.015 (0.052) 0.476 (0.051) 0.059 (0.024) 0.189 (0.038)
constant -0.454 (0.115) -0.926 (0.096) -0.804 (0.068) -0.681 (0.084)
log(calendar month of entry) 0.052 (0.046) 0.100 (0.053) -0.038 (0.021) -0.023 (0.030)
male -0.127 (0.091) 0.041 (0.082) -0.007 (0.043) -0.058 (0.061)
at most lower secondary degree 0.012 (0.093) 0.096 (0.082) 0.067 (0.046) 0.082 (0.063)
<30 years old 0.067 (0.090) 0.114 (0.085) 0.019 (0.044) 0.008 (0.061)
>1 unemployment spells since July 1999 -0.293 (0.088) -0.060 (0.082) -0.033 (0.044) -0.098 (0.060)
Source: FHS-ANPE. First spell per individual, excluding unknown destination. 390945 spells. Other parameters not presented. In bold, estimates
significantly different from zero at 5%.
Table 7: Estimates of heterogeneous treatment effects
Skill 
assessment
Project 
assessment
Job-search 
support
Project 
support
Unemployment - Employment transition
Employment-Unemployment transition
Figure 1: Schemes empirical duration dependence - Kaplan-Meier 
estimates
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Figure 2: Unemployment and employment 
empirical duration dependence - Kaplan-Meier estimates
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
30 90 15
0
21
0
27
0
33
0
39
0
45
0
51
0
57
0
63
0
69
0
75
0
81
0
87
0
Duration in days
H
az
ar
d 
(p
er
 m
on
th
)
Unemployment duration (exit to employment) Employment duration (exit to unemployment)
Figure 3: Schemes estimated duration dependence 
(from the full model)
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Figure 4: Unemployment and employment estimated duration dependence 
(from the full model)
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Shifts in the cumulative exit rates to employment and to unemployment due to program participation, for the population that received each treament. The shift
to employment is the shift t days after treatment has been received (it mixes individuals that received treatment at different dates). 
Figure 5a: Simulated effect of Skill assessment
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Figure 5b: Simulated effect of Project assessment
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Figure 5c: Simulated effect of Job-search support
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Figure 5d: Simulated effect of Project support
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Shift in the global cumulative exit rate to employment, t days after entering unemployment, due to program participation,
accounting for program assignment up to day t, and shift in the global cumulative exit rate to unemployment, t days after
the begining of an employment spell (individual exiting to employment before receiving treatment have a zero treatment
effect).
Figure 6: General simulated effect of all treatments
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